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Abstract: The article firstly examines the different conceptions of dialogue and reason within political 
theory, especially in the work of Rawls. Secondly we explore multicultural political theorists who have 
been motivated less by abstract reasoning by a sole reasoner or identical identity-less individuals and 
more by dialogue. For such multiculturalists, the principles of social justice are not known in advance or 
simply by reason, but are arrived at by conflict and learning, by dialogue and negotiation in circumstances 
of inequality and minority-claims making. In response to the multiculturalists, interculturalists allege that 
multiculturalism is too focused on the macro and the conflictual, and dialogue should be redirected to the 
micro and the cooperative. Although I welcome the interculturalists’ focus on micro-relations, this does not 
require abandoning the idea of dialogue at the level of political controversies and public discourses. It is not 
an either–or choice because groups and intergroup problems exist in society and cannot be simply handled 
at a micro level of contact, interaction and sociability. The kind of macro-level dialogue that I am speaking of 
can also be understood as a form of public intellectual engagement that can contribute to societal dialogues.
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1  Dialogue and Reason in Political Theory1
A good place to begin the topic of dialogue and the contribution of intellectuals, and especially of political 
theory, is with Socrates. Not only does he, as he appears in the works of his student Plato, take us to what 
may iconically represent the founding moment of western philosophy and political theory, he also takes 
us to the most basic meanings of the term “dialogue”, namely, focused oral communication between at 
least two interlocutors or its portrayal as a literary genre. Socrates was famous for endlessly questioning 
individuals in the public square, the agora, and Plato wrote dialogues. Plato’s dialogues take two forms. 
Most of the early dialogues, referred to as eristic, take the form of an interrogation. Socrates is portrayed 
engaged in a hostile series of questions aimed to show that his interlocutor, often a well-known “Sophist”, 
does not know what he is talking about.2 Socrates sets out to destroy the argument of his interlocutor and 
to discredit him as either a teacher, a learned person, or an authority on wise conduct. These dialogues 
typically end in a breakdown with Socrates’ opponent alleging that Socrates is constantly twisting his 
words for his own self-aggrandisement, so there is no point in carrying on. The other kind of dialogue, 
of which The Republic is the most famous example, is more like an interview and consists of a rational 
cooperation to discover the Truth.
1 This article is a reprint of Tariq Modood (2017) ‘Intercultural public intellectual engagement’ in Fethi Mansouri (ed) 
Interculturalism at the Crossroads: Comparative perspectives on concepts, policies and practice, United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization, France, pp. 83-102.
2 Google defines a sophist as: ‘a paid teacher of philosophy and rhetoric in Greece in the Classical and Hellenistic periods, 
associated in popular thought with moral scepticism and specious reasoning’.
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While both these kinds of oral exchanges have lived on and are central to the disciplines of philosophy 
and political theory—as in the “Q and A” after a lecture, at a seminar or tutorial—the dialogue as a literary 
form is the exception rather than the norm in any academic discipline. While the oral exchanges, principally 
of the adversarial kind, do have a lively presence in certain democracies, not to mention in courts of law, 
the dominant mode of reasoning together that modern theorists have conceived as appropriate for the 
most fundamental questions of political life is altogether different. The dominant tradition in modern 
western political theory is that of the “social contract”. When theorists like Thomas Hobbes, John Locke 
or Jacques Rousseau pose questions about why polities exist and what gives rulers the right to rule, they 
assume that the question is posed of individuals who can be hypothesised to give their free consent. This 
assumes that the individuals know what they want. They negotiate amongst themselves to get the best 
deal for themselves or for all parties, yet they reason about the founding of states and coercive laws on 
the basis of pre-existing desires and preferences, which are already known to them. There is, however, 
one line of continuity with Socrates. While it is assumed that individuals will vary in their desires, it is 
further assumed that there is a single truth, a single set of principles or correct answer to be discovered by 
Reason.
While Hobbes postulated that all would rationally choose to subject themselves to absolute authority 
because the alternative, the “state of nature”, was permanent insecurity and constant likelihood of death 
(Hobbes 1968 [1651]). Locke thought all persons had certain natural rights that could not be overridden, and 
so individuals would only give their consent to be ruled by a state which had a mechanism for self-limiting 
its power by, for example, having an independent judiciary to check that the government respected the 
rights of each individual (Locke 1966 [1690]). Rousseau took this idea of individuals contracting to obey a 
common authority further by conceiving it as not just a foundational act, but as a process of democratic law 
making by citizens. For him, this meant that that the conditions for the emergence of law in an assembly 
had to be of a particular kind. Above all, they should be such that the citizens should not be thinking in 
terms of their personal desires or gain, their class interests or political party membership, but should think 
in terms of what was best for the republic. Only then would their “general will”, as opposed to a collection 
of personal wills, manifest itself (Rousseau 1920 [1762]).
John Rawls is the most important recent theorist in this tradition. He too looks to found politics and 
social justice on what free, rational individuals would collectively agree to after discussion. Like Rousseau, 
Rawls thinks that the conditions or circumstances in which such dialogue takes place are critical. The 
discussants should be able to focus on what is good for individuals in general, or to put it differently, what 
all individuals would want after reflection, not on what individuals like themselves would want. They must 
think selflessly—literally. Rawls designs a thought experiment, the centrepiece of which is what he calls 
“the Veil of Ignorance” (Rawls 1971). For the deliberation of individuals to lead to the discovery of social 
justice or ‘fair terms of social cooperation’ (Rawls 1985, p. 232) they must be made ignorant—stripped of 
their specific identities such as their gender, their class, their nationality, culture, religion and so on. So 
none of the reasoners knows, for example, whether they are rich or poor, black or white, Christian or 
Muslim and so on. So no one will risk favouring laws and policies that unduly favour a particular class, 
race, or religion so that when, at the end of the deliberation, the Veil is lifted and they (re)learn who they 
are, it turns out they are not of the group they favoured. 
Rawls’ claim is, then, that the principles of social justice can only be worked out by individuals, 
intellectuals, law-makers, benign governments and so on, to the extent that they approximate being selfless 
or identity-less reasoners. That, however, means that dialogue among such individuals is not necessary 
because, stripped of all their differences, such reasoners are identical. One reasoner can, in theory, come 
up with the just solution without there having to be a dialogue among all the citizens. Moreover, behind 
the Veil of Ignorance, the debate makes no difference concerning what is valuable in the product of the 
debate. The product—the principles that a diverse society should live by—are not influenced by who is or is 
not included in the debate, and so they remain the same however the debate goes. That is to say, they are 
not influenced by the debate and could indeed have been known without any dialogue having taken place. 
More precisely, they are known by reason not by dialogue or by who participates in the dialogue.
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2  Dialogue as used by Multiculturalists
This is not, however, how multiculturalists have approached political theory. Dialogue, rather than abstract 
reasoning by a sole reasoner or identical identity-less individuals, has motivated multiculturalists. They 
assume that the context for politics is already thoroughly imbued with dominant ways of thinking and 
doing—with cultural orientations such as national history and language, with religious and/or secular 
perspectives, with institutional norms and so on—and that these contextual factors cannot be abstracted 
out so as to identify a set of culture-–free problems. Moreover, the relationship between the relevant parties 
is likely to involve domination–subordination, or inclusion–exclusion and that the weaker or newer party 
is likely to lack recognition or be misrecognised (Taylor 1994). Dialogue rather than identity-less reasoning 
will be relevant here for at least three reasons. Firstly, the solution to the problem, or the arriving of a 
principle by which to address the problem, needs an effort at cross-cultural understanding. It is not just 
a question of taking material interests into account, but a matter of (re)designing the shared public space 
and rules of conduct so diverse cultural commitments and needs are explicitly taken into account, so that 
the public space does not simply reflect the dominant culture, but is opened up to accommodate new or 
marginalised minorities. Secondly, this means that the solution is genuinely open. By this I do not mean 
that “anything goes”. Rather, that the solution cannot be predicted in advance in the way that, say, the final 
step of a piece of mathematical reasoning can, of which we say the answer was there all along waiting to 
be discovered. The dialogue makes a difference: it contributes to a growth of understanding that genuinely 
is novel or additional to what was present before and the quality or character of the dialogue is dependent 
on the participants, not simply in terms of their power of reasoning but in terms of “where they are coming 
from”, so that with different parties a different outcome would have been reached. Thirdly, the dialogue 
is important not just in discovering an outcome, but in building a relationship of trust, co-operation and 
ultimately of belonging together between parties to the dialogue. These three reasons makes the dialogue 
very different from the “behind the veil” reasoning of identity-less reasoners.
The multiculturalist political theorists I have in mind include Iris Young, who assisted people in 
understanding themselves as oppressed, discovering themselves in collective identities such as black or 
gay, and to thus develop a liberatory identity and group politics and use it to engage with other groups to 
institute a new form of democratic politics (Young 1990). Charles Taylor’s idea of a dialogical ethics and 
politics based on “recognising” those whose distinct cultural identities have been dismissed or held in 
contempt—such as the identities of African-Americans in the USA or Francophone Quebecers in Canada—
is also an example (Taylor 1994). Interestingly, in his more recent work, Taylor relates his approach to 
diversity to a Rawlsian idea, that of ‘an overlapping consensus’ (Rawls 1987; Taylor 2009).3 For Rawls, this 
referred to the body of laws and policies that those with different religious and cultural perspectives could 
all agree on by focusing on politics rather than their full set of religious and value commitments. Taylor 
rejects the idea of the identity-less self (sometimes referred to as ‘the unencumbered self’) and abstract 
reasoning as the method for arriving at a consensus. He borrows and adapts ‘overlapping consensus’, but 
makes the process of arriving at it much more expansive and dynamic so that it in fact is best understood 
as consensus building; something not given but to be worked at, including through new interpretations 
of actors’ points of views, one of the things that one might expect from a dialogue (Taylor 2009). James 
Tully has continually emphasised that cooperation under conditions of deep diversity or ‘multiplicity’ 
requires a ‘multilogue’ (Tully 1995), and has proposed the idea of ‘public philosophy’, the questioning 
of society’s dominant assumptions to expose their contingency—their lack of necessity—and so open the 
way to identifying other possible ways of thinking and living (Tully 2008). Bhikhu Parekh explicitly makes 
intercultural dialogue central to his conception of multiculturalism. His interventions in relation to The 
Satanic Verses Affair, in which he argued against a freedom-of-speech absolutism and argued that angry 
Muslims must be given a sympathetic hearing, are exemplary (Parekh 1989).4 While fully recognising that 
3 At this stage Rawls had moved away from the Veil of Ignorance methodology of his most famous work (Rawls 1971) as 
described earlier.
4 When published in March 1989, five weeks after Khomeini’s infamous fatwa, it was way ahead of the debate to which it 
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in such public controversies the majority dominate public discourse, and often in a manner that is not 
conducive to dialogue or mutual learning, he argues that multiculturalism is not about allowing each 
minority to-live-as-it-wishes relativism (Parekh 2006). Rather, it is about ensuring that there is a genuine 
dialogue and that the minority is allowed to express its point of view. While such dialogues inevitably have 
a majoritarian or status quo starting point, because even while wanting to express unfamiliar sensibilities 
and bring in new arguments, minorities are primarily trying to persuade the majority. This often takes the 
form of a minority arguing that what it is seeking is not so different to what the majority, at one time or 
another, has sought for itself. In so arguing, the minority must justify itself by appealing to—even while 
seeking to modify—the existing ‘operative public values’ which structure public debate and what is thought 
to be legitimate or reasonable in that polity at the time (Parekh 2006, p. 267).5
For such multiculturalists, the principles of social justice are not known in advance or simply by reason, 
but are arrived at by conflict and learning, by dialogue and negotiation in circumstances of inequality and 
minority-claims making. Admittedly, in Rawls’ methodology, there is a to-ing and fro-ing from principles 
and experience/particularities/context—what he calls ‘reflective equilibrium’ (Rawls 1971). But it can be 
done by an isolated reasoner or an assembly of identity-less, selfless reasoners, because at its best it is 
disinterested, selfless reasoning carried on far away from conflict. For the multiculturalists, the dialogue 
is claims based and contentious, and based on identity assertion (relative to other identities), not identity 
effacement. It seeks to get beyond—even if it never gets there—the conflict or challenge to which it gives rise 
by urging the recognition of the excluded, the inferiorised and the misrecognised, and by the formation of 
new, inclusive, hyphenated and multiple overlapping identities. The dialogue comes into being because of 
identity-based claims; it proceeds by recognising identities; and its goal, its teleology, is the construction 
of new identities and new relationships, which are not reducible to redistribution.
3  Multiculturalism and Interculturalism
The kind of public intellectual engagement or multiculturalist dialogue I am arguing for here needs to 
be contrasted with other conceptions of intercultural dialogue. It can, for example, be contrasted with 
a philosophical multiculturalism which is concerned to develop a frame in which different cultures and 
religions can come to an understanding of each other and, therefore, to a richer understanding of humanity. 
Taylor, for example, sees the ultimate frontier of the politics of recognition as being the development of 
sensibilities and ways of thinking that allow us to understand cultures radically different from our own and 
thereby evaluate their contribution to human civilisation (Taylor 1994). Taylor also he sees this frontier as 
far from contemporary capacities. Similarly, Parekh emphasises that the ultimate value of multiculturalism 
lies in cross-cultural and cross-civilisational understanding through which we simultaneously appreciate 
the varied ways to be human, whilst more profoundly understanding one’s own distinctive location (Parekh 
2000). While my own formulation of multiculturalism is built on a reading of Taylor and Parekh (among 
others), the philosophical views which I have just ascribed to them carry important and controversial 
philosophical theses, which I can leave to one side. For example, Taylor’s suggestion that different 
cultures can be evaluated and ranked by and against each other. Or, Parekh’s moral intersubjectivism: 
the view that values and morality, while grounded in a conception of human nature, ultimately have no 
foundations independent of reasoning selves (Parekh 2006, p. 128). These are debates that I do not need to 
enter. My interest and advocacy is confined to political multiculturalism. While Parekh and Taylor locate 
their political multiculturalism within a wider, philosophical multiculturalism, I am not locating political 
contributed. Besides his own publications, Parekh used his office as part-time Deputy Director of the Commission for Racial 
Equality at the time to convene three workshops on the topic, the publications from which also considerably raised the level 
of intellectual engagement.
5 This also at least partly gives political multiculturalism the character of a bottoms-up mobilisation, paralleling other kinds of 
identity politics like feminism or gay pride, as I display in relation to Britain (Modood 2005). Bloemraad (2015, p. 11), however, 
has argued that that multicultural discourse and policy in Canada, Australia and Sweden was elite-driven.
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multiculturalism in anything bigger than itself, or more precisely, in nothing bigger than contemporary 
ideas of democratic citizenship and belonging (Modood 2013, pp. 60–61). 
Relatedly, I leave to one side how what I am presenting as multiculturalist dialogue relates to identity 
groups at an international or global level, as in the idea of a “dialogue of civilizations”. I will confine 
myself to an intranational context, and more specifically to liberal democratic contexts. Within such 
contexts there has been a reaction to multiculturalism that relates to the question of dialogue, specifically 
to intercultural or interfaith dialogue. Multiculturalism has been criticised at many levels and across the 
political and intellectual spectrums, but I am referring to one specific position that goes under the name 
of “interculturalism”. To be more precise, there are at least two reactions that use the same self-label. One 
reaction is specific to Quebec and is very much connected to Quebec nationalism (Meer and Modood 2012; 
Modood 2014). This interculturalism, however, is not a rejection of dialogical or identity politics. On the 
contrary, it conceives of the multiculturalism of Canadian federal government as not sufficiently dialogical, 
but as being too based on justiciable individual rights and judges rather than on political dialogue (Gagnon 
and Iacovino 2006). The other interculturalism is associated with the Council of Europe (2008) and UNESCO 
(2008). These bodies have produced a critique of multiculturalism, which, with Nasar Meer, I have examined 
and rebutted elsewhere (Meer & Modood 2012).6 Our argument was that this interculturalist critique is of 
a caricature without any significant reference to the views of any multiculturalist authors, theorists and 
advocates, or even to policies advanced in the name of multiculturalism, say in the UK, Canada, USA or 
Australia. It simply associated multiculturalism with separatism, ghettoisation and anti-integration (Meer 
& Modood 2012; see Meer, Modood & Zapata-Barrera 2016 for a multisided debate). My point of interest here 
is on only one aspect of the interculturalist critique and the corresponding positive recommendation. This 
is the argument that multiculturalists have been too focused on general public discourses, especially at a 
macro national level, whereas the real work of social acceptance, equality and living in diversity is at the 
level of everyday life in one’s neighbourhood, school, workplace and so on (Loobuyck 2016). At the level 
of the latter, people rub along without major value conflicts, but nevertheless, intercultural encounters 
rather than avoidance of contact is essential for a multicultural society and so it is at these micro levels 
that the techniques for intercultural dialogue needs to be learnt and practiced (Wise & Velayutham, 2009). 
Multiculturalism, it is alleged, is too focused on the macro and the conflictual, and dialogue should be 
redirected to the micro and the cooperative.7 My response to this critique is to accept it as a correction to an 
exclusively macro and political focus but to reject it as presenting an either–or choice. One can welcome 
the interculturalists’ focus on microrelations, but this does not require abandoning the idea of dialogue at 
the level of political controversies and public discourses. Groups and intergroup problems exist in society 
and cannot be simply handled at a micro level of contact, interaction and sociability.8
6 Oddly enough, while the cited article has been viewed and cited in numbers that are satisfying to its authors, and the article 
was published together with four responses and a rejoinder, it is not too unusual for the article, which engages with the 
interculturalist critique of multiculturalism, to be read as an endorsement of that critique, when it is of course a multiculturalist 
riposte to that critique.
7 In its British version the critique is less likely to be expressed in terms of ‘interculturalism’ and more in terms of a positive focus 
on ‘multiculture’ or ‘conviviality’ or ‘everyday multiculturalism’. I have subsumed it under what I refer to as ‘cosmopolitanism’. 
Under ‘cosmopolitanism’ I bring together the interculturalist emphasis on cultural encounters and everyday interaction in 
localities, schools, clubs, public spaces, the multiple and fluid character of identity, the emphasis on the transnational and on 
globalisation and the ‘problematising’ of the national (Modood 2012).
8 Loobuyck too uses the macro–micro distinction  to distinguish between interculturalism and multiculturalism, but he 
conflates it with a state-civil society distinction (Loobuyck 2016, p. 230) and does not see that multiculturalism is not confined 
to the state and extends to citizen-to-citizen relations (Modood 2007/2013: chapter 6). Contrary to another distinction he 
makes, multiculturalism is not just about justice and neglects the importance of belonging: on the contrary, belonging is more 
central to multicultural nationalism than either the liberal goal of furthering autonomy or the social democratic means of 
redistribution of resources. Stokke and Lybaek 2016 offer a better combining of intercultural dialogue with the kind of political 
multiculturalism that I advocate, but they perhaps overstate the separation of multiculturalism at the level of political critique 
and mobilisation from multiculturalism at the level of state. In my view, multiculturalists need to draw the state into public 
dialogues, not define it as something beyond the scope of the reach of dialogue and learning.
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4  Public Intellectual Engagement 
The kind of macro-level dialogue that I am speaking of can also be understood as a form of public intellectual 
engagement. One of the best known statements on the nature of public intellectuals in recent times is that 
by Edward Said (Said 1996). Following Gramsci, he drew a contrast between traditional intellectuals, who 
here we might understand as academics, and ‘organic intellectuals’, namely those who serve particular 
organisations, such as journalists, or lobby for particular interests for a fee, or have an expertise, such as 
an economist or a scientist working for a government (ibid., pp. 4, 13). Derived from a characterisation by 
Benda, Said writes of a third kind of intellectual, ‘of the intellectual as a being set apart’ (ibid., p. 8), angry 
and oppositional, a critic of all worldly powers. They marry the academic’s commitment to intellectual 
values, but combine it with a critique of injustice, which is aimed, not just at fellow specialists, but at as 
wide a public audience as they can manage. I can offer my understanding of public intellectual engagement 
by relating to Said’s idea of a public intellectual, which I find too one-sided and painted too starkly.
An example of the one-sidedness I mean is the detachment from society that Said attributes to public 
intellectuals. He argues that their aim is to uphold universal ‘standards of truth about human misery and 
oppression … despite the individual intellectual’s party affiliation, national background, and primeval 
loyalties’ (ibid., p. xii). Of course this kind of integrity is what one requires not just from public intellectuals 
but from all professionals, such as academics, doctors, judges, engineers and so on. It is neither distinctive 
of public intellectuals, nor does it mean that those with such responsibilities have to be less members 
of their society; that they share less understanding and concerns with their co-ethnic, co-religionists or 
co-nationals, or do not care about the well-being of their groups (including protesting when they think 
injustice is being done by their groups). Yet, Said describes public intellectuals as, indeed exhorts them to 
be, ‘outsiders and exiles’ (ibid., p.51) and admiringly quotes Adorno: ‘It is part of morality not to be at home 
in one’s home’ (ibid., p. 57; italics in original). Said notes that ‘[b]ecause the exile sees things both in terms 
of what has been left behind and what is actual here and now, there is a double perspective that never sees 
things in isolation’ (ibid., p. 60). Thus, despite presenting a self-image of the intellectual as standing outside 
or above the society with which s/he is engaging, Said recognises there actually has to be one (or more 
typically, multiple) commitment to a people(s) or concrete institutions and practices, not just to abstract 
principles like Truth or Justice or Humanity. My point is that commitments to groups, people, causes, 
institutions, one’s country, and so on are not incidental to an engaged public intellectual or a nuisance it 
would be best did not exist. They are as essential to the public intellectual as the commitment to intellectual 
integrity. The public intellectual has to care about a people, a place or a cause, and not just about being an 
intellectual (brought out nicely in relation to George Orwell and Albert Camus in Walzer 2002). The public 
intellectual has to have a home, but this commitment must not be blind or incompatible with an equally 
strong commitment to intellectuality. Just as, of course, there must not be a blind commitment to certain 
intellectual points of view and theories, including those which have the prefix of “critical”; a prefix that 
seems to some to be a badge of adherence rather than something to deconstruct. The public intellectual 
endeavour is to engage in and lead the moral, ethical and political conversation that any society has with 
itself, and while some “outsider” features can offer some epistemological advantages (and no doubt some 
blind spots), one needs to be part of the society that one seeks to engage.
 Said cites the African-Americans James Baldwin and Malcolm X as exemplars of public intellectuals 
(Said 1996, p. xvii). Yet they were individuals who knew which side they were on. They were outsiders to 
certain structures of power but not outsiders to groups, to belonging and commitment to the well-being of the 
groups to which they (thought) they belonged. It is most unlikely that they endorsed Said’s motto of ‘Never 
solidarity before criticism’ (ibid., p. 32). In Said’s own case there was a passionate lifelong commitment 
to the Palestinian people. Moreover, when it comes to multiculturalist public intellectuals, they are likely 
to belong to more than one group, and so are unlikely to be either wholly insiders or outsiders; again 
something that describes Said as an eminent American. The public intellectual, then, has to negotiate 
critical outsiderness and epistemological insiderness and belonging, solidarity and rootedness. S/he does 
not need to give up entirely on her social roots; indeed, to do so is to risk losing an important understanding 
and sympathy for her group or society as well as trust and standing with the group and/or society. So, it is 
42    Tariq Modood
not to cultivate blind loyalty, nor is it to go into exile; it is much better to develop multiple belongings and 
possibilities of dialogue rather than exile or aloofness from the concerns of one’s group or society. 
A similar one-sidedness characterises Said’s distancing of public intellectuality from ‘specialisation’ 
(ibid., p. 76) and ‘expertise’ (ibid., p. 77), overlooking that a public intellectual has to be in one or some 
intellectual discipline(s). He argues that ‘[t]he particular threat to the intellectual today … [is] an attitude 
that I will call professionalism’ (ibid., p. 73), which he describes as treating intellectual work as just a 
job, on a nine-to-five basis, the demotion of an intellectual vocation to what today is likely to be called 
“work–life balance”. Said also worries about intellectuals seeking acceptance, prestige and honours (ibid., 
pp. 100–1). I agree that some university institutional cultures—such as that of Britain, say, during 1990–
2010—encouraged a narrow scholasticism, typified by the high esteem bestowed on disciplinary jargons 
and low esteem on clarity, but Said is too dismissive of expertise (Modood 2009). Much scientific expertise 
improves material living standards, public services and personal well-being. It is about engaging with the 
pressing needs of individuals and communities, such as seeking a cure for cancer, reducing world poverty 
or contributing to the advancement of “the knowledge society” with a view to improving regional and 
national productivity and promoting technological innovation. We may agree with Said, however, that such 
activity is not public intellectual engagement, which is about an intellectual speaking in their own voice to 
a public, not about research teams, new techniques and purely material concerns. And as for an intellectual 
not seeking honours, yes, that can’t be the primary motive, but it is the case that there is—and should 
be—honour and recognition, and social status in public intellectual engagement. It is odd that Said, who 
received much such acclaim (including being chosen by the BBC to deliver the prestigious Reith Lectures, 
in which he presented the views I am discussing), should fail to mention it. A better understanding of how 
the professional, the personal, and what one might call honourable ambition interplay, is captured in this 
description of public intellectuals as ‘those who live with the tensions generated by the contrasting pulls 
of specialist focus and peer recognition, on the one hand, and on the other the risks and thrills associated 
with being known as someone who addresses a much wider range of publics on issues of general concern’ 
(Kenny 2008, p. 7). Of course these different elements are not always in harmony, but it is not a betrayal 
of vocation to recognise the fact and the dangers of competing motives and purposes rather than to define 
public intellectuals in ascetic and purist terms.
Despite Said’s tendency to sometimes express himself in a one-sided way, he also offers a more complex 
characterisation and is closer to the mark when he does so, for example: 
‘There is therefore this quite complicated mix between the private and the public worlds, my own history, values, writings 
and positions as they derive from my experiences, on the one hand, and on the other hand, how these enter into the social 
world where people debate and make decisions about war and freedom and justice’ (Said 1996, p. 12). 
There is however one issue on which I do not simply think Said has a preference, albeit exercised inconsistently, 
for one-sidedness, but where our views collide. In earlier talking of Parekh as a multiculturalist public 
intellectual, I evidenced his interventions in relation to the crisis around Salman Rushdie’s novel, The 
Satanic Verses. It happens that Said too refers to this crisis and states that to have failed to have defended 
this novel is ‘to betray the intellectual’s calling’ (ibid., p.89). This is because ‘uncompromising freedom of 
opinion and expression is the secular intellectual’s main bastion’ (ibid., p.89). In addition to what I have 
already said in relation to Parekh, in the interview below I give my own reasons for my own intervention 
in this crisis and so will not add anything more here. It may be that by “secular”, Said does not mean non-
religious but as someone who does not have a ‘belief in a political god’ (ibid., p. 109) or ‘a total dogmatic 
system’ (ibid., p. 113). If so, I share that view and have warned of ‘the danger of ideology’ in discussions of 
multiculturalism (Said 2013, pp. 118–122). I suspect, however, that in at least one respect I take the freedom 
owed to public intellectuals further than Said, who so passionately defines the latter in anti-establishment 
and anti-national terms. Michael Burawoy, who initiated a major, international debate about the nature 
of public sociology, offered the same kind of political restrictedness, arguing that it ‘defends the interests 
of humanity’, which he interpreted to mean standing up for civil society against the market and the state 
(Burawoy 2005, p. 24). My colleague, Gregor McLennan, has added that if one can impose political tasks 
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on sociology then his own list includes resistance to ‘the encroachments of religiosity’ (McLennan 2007, p. 
859). In contrast, I think a public intellectual must be politically free to be left-wing, right-wing, centrist, 
religious, secular and so on—and of course to argue for his point of view by attending to other, especially 
dissenting voices, and respond to objections and critiques. Public intellectual engagement is of course 
political, not neutral, but it is a dialogue or a multilogue of complementary and contending intellectual–
political positions and one cannot appropriate a whole discipline such as sociology or political theory for 
one’s own normative position or against a colleague’s (as Burawoy 2005 also, if inconsistently, argues). 
Or, as Hashemi argues, by juxtaposing the theorist of the Iranian Revolution, Ali Shariati, with Burawoy, 
‘public sociology can work as a frame of debate about the priority of each battlefield. Otherwise, it can be 
easily turned into a target for the criticism of those who do not share the interest in Burawoy’s preferred 
struggle’ (Hashemi 2016). The field outside the academy that public intellectuals are committed to is not 
civil society but the home of “the public”, which we may call “the public sphere” following this excellent 
quote from Andrew Gamble which sums up in what way intellectuals are public or political:
The political theorists of multiculturalism such as Bhikhu Parekh … have been active participants in politics in the sense 
that they seek to advance the political education of citizens, by articulating choices, framing questions, offering alterna-
tives, and challenging orthodoxies and entrenched attitudes. They address themselves to the public, not to [just] coteries 
of experts, or office holders. They are essential builders of the public sphere (Gamble 2015, p. 297).
One of the ways, then, that intellectuals can contribute to societal dialogues is through what I will call 
“public intellectual engagement”. As an exemplification of what I have in mind as an aspiration and in 
relation to multiculturalism, I offer in Part II the interview I gave to Simon Thompson (Modood 2016a). It 
refers to my own engagement with some of the challenges that the presence of British Muslims as British 
citizens creates for British public culture and the national citizenship. In relation to this theme, I have 
already mentioned Bhikhu Parekh above and my appreciation of him as an outstanding British public 
intellectual.9
5  Part II : Tariq Modood: On being a public intellectual, a Muslim 
and a multiculturalist10 
5.1  Interview by Simon Thompson
What does it mean to be a public intellectual?
Intellectual or academic life is usually organised in disciplines, and intellectuals’ questions come out 
of those disciplines. But in public intellectual engagement the question does not primarily come out of a 
discipline. It comes from the public. It concerns our relations with each other as members of a society and 
especially as citizens of a polity. A public intellectual is a concerned citizen who accepts responsibility for 
their society and brings to its understanding insights of their discipline. 
Most of what salaried academics do is contribute to their disciplinary community or to a broader 
academic community. So, a political theorist may say, ‘Hannah Arendt was engaged with this question. 
This is a question that is still alive and her thought on this is strangely lucid. I want to revisit it and 
perhaps recover neglected aspects of it’. These questions all arise organically from thinking about Hannah 
Arendt. 
9 This is nicely brought out in his conversations with Ramin Jahanbegloo in which his review of the principal themes of his 
opus display how an engagement with contemporary politics is a guiding thread (Parekh & Jahanbegloo 2011). 
10 A longer version of this interview was originally given and recorded in March 2015 and a considerably shortened and edited 
version appeared in the journal Renewal in its April 2016 issue (Modood 2016a) and is reproduced here with kind permission 
of the editors of Renewal.
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But we also at times think about questions that don’t just arise from the discipline. So, for example, 
we think about the relationship between religious identity and political equality. Is there any relation? 
Does political equality simply mean we are not interested in anybody’s religious identity? We simply don’t 
suppress or promote any such identities? Sounds plausible. But then if we think about it we realise that in 
fact, some people’s religious identity tells them to have an ethical orientation which is clearly social and 
political—to do with questions like what kind of economic relations to have or not have, to be hospitable to 
refugees or not. Whereas for other people their religious identity is an entirely private matter.
So if political equality means merely ignoring religious identities, we are favouring religious identities 
that are purely private, and not treating all religious identities equally. We’re preferring a particular kind 
of religious identity. So now we are not just talking about, say, Hannah Arendt’s ideas. We’re thinking 
about our existing political arrangements in light of the claims that some Muslims or some Christians or, 
for that matter, some “new atheists” are making about political life and equality. We are engaged in public 
questions. But we are still drawing on academic conversations, academic tools, academic perspectives.11 
Do you think we’ve resolved this question—about how to square equality for all religious identities with 
political equality—in Britain? 
I think we have entered a period where we are rethinking the place of religion in relation to equality 
and the public sphere. But there’s a deep antipathy to treating religious identities on a par with others. A 
good measure of this is how in the Labour Party or in a major trade union there can be a women’s section, 
an LGBT section, a black or ethnic minorities section, but we can all imagine the consternation if and when 
Muslims ask for a Muslim or a religious minorities section!
Should all intellectuals or academics be public intellectuals?
Intellectual life, like society, has a division of labour. I’m not saying: ‘all academics or sociologists or 
political theorists must engage in intellectual activity of just one kind.’ The pursuit of knowledge for its 
own sake is a good, though it’s not the only good we should be concerned with. We need a certain amount 
of publically supported fundamental or “blue skies” or pure academic research, because who knows what 
will come from it? Even the publically engaged intellectual working on political theory will still get a lot of 
value from the person who says ‘I really want to understand Arendt.’
Public engagement is desirable rather than essential for individual academics. But when it comes to 
the collective—a department of politics or a school of sociology—I think it is essential for at least some of 
its members to be engaged. And what I mean by desirable is not simply “optional”; public engagement is 
something that should be pursued if possible. 
Do you see yourself as bringing a specifically Muslim voice to public debate?
To answer this we need to go back to the Rushdie affair. The Rushdie affair was a pivotal intellectual and 
biographical moment for me, because in some ways I came to be a Muslim at that time. It would have been 
quite straightforward for me to walk away from all these angry, aggressive Muslims and simply say: they 
have nothing to do with me. But I thought instead: these people are something to do with me. I was working 
in racial equality and community relations, I had a sense of belonging, solidarity, with a community of 
suffering. I was aware of and proud of my Pakistani roots. I thought of myself as British Asian, so to extend 
that to think of myself as a British Asian Muslim didn’t seem such a leap. But it wasn’t obvious either. I 
knew other British Asians who didn’t want to have anything to do with these “fundamentalists”. I felt I 
needed to address Muslims as much as I needed to address the wider public, and I needed to address them 
in a way that both exhibited identification and solidarity with them and said: this is where I stand and this 
is where we should stand—and we should distinguish ourselves from some other Muslim positions. So it was 
a critical stance, but I was expressing it as a Muslim.12 
11 In an earlier interview I give more content to the idea of a public intellectual by reference to Bhikhu Parekh and Stuart 
Hall, who have inspired me and exemplify two different kinds of public intellectuals: the reformer and the critic respectively; 
see D. O. Martinez (2013), ‘Intellectual biography, empirical sociology and normative political theory:  An interview with Tariq 
Modood’, Journal of Intercultural Studies, 34(6).
12 Examples of my public or journalistic interventions in relation to the Rushdie Affair are collected in Modood 1992, pp. 
69-87. 
 Intercultural Public Intellectual Engagement   45
My biography, or my social location, as a brown Brit of Pakistani origins and Muslim background, is 
very present in my work—both in the questions I am engaged with, and also to some extent the answers. 
But I don’t think of myself as simply speaking as a Muslim. When I speak, I speak as a multiculturalist above 
all. This is the intellectual commitment that I bring to public debate.
Should public intellectuals stand up for the marginalised or dispossessed? 
I don’t accept the argument that the role of intellectuals is to always support the weaker party. We 
should all attend to the state of the weaker party. But that is an issue of justice and fairness, it’s not 
especially to do with political theory or sociology or being an intellectual. 
The answer to your question comes back again to the Rushdie affair. At that time, there were at least 
two prominent things motivating me. Concern for the well-being of British society. And concern for the 
well-being of British Muslims as a particular part of British society. I was trying to follow these two deep 
personal commitments equally. It wasn’t just Muslims and Salman Rushdie who were affected. British 
society was affected by this incident—and, in fact, this set of issues is not confined to one country. 
Some people might say about me: ‘he doesn’t care about Britain, he just wants to look after the Muslim 
constituency.’ I personally have never thought along those lines. I have an abiding concern for the well-
being of British society, which doesn’t mean that British society sometimes doesn’t misunderstand where its 
well-being lies. When I try and engage with a broader British public, I am trying to get people to think about 
what is really good for British society. What is consistent with its beliefs and long-term character? Because, 
of course, British society has to work and adapt to include in a fair and just way what we might call the new 
British. What I have been concerned about—in the Rushdie affair and after—has not been the well-being of 
Muslims per se, but the well-being of Muslims who are part of British society and whose future is part of 
British society. The well-being of these parties is entangled, and the conflictual parts of the entanglement 
have to be worked out so that the well-being of each becomes interdependent and, if you like, integrated. 
Does sharing an identity mean sharing solidarity?
My biography gives me insights and a sensibility that others don’t have. I don’t claim to be especially 
empathetic, but I can say that I know certain things, having been brought up as a Muslim, having been an 
Asian in Britain since I was a child, and going to a very white, working-class school with a lot of racist and 
other kinds of bullying. I think this was the basis for my career. I could see that the way that British society 
was beginning to politically conceptualize the issues around race in the 1970s and 80s just did not fit 
with my own sense of who I was. And I felt that I was actually the norm in Asian communities and not the 
exception; for example, like most British Asians, I did not think I was black, nor, of course, white; nor did 
I define myself against Britishness but as making a new, distinctive claim on it. That gave me the basis for 
arguing against a kind of black–white racial dualism and towards ethnic pluralism—towards multicultural 
Britishness, where there are different ways of being British. 
The emergence of religion as a live issue, in particular the assertion of Muslim identity, was actually a 
bit of a surprise to me. When I first heard about the Rushdie affair I thought, ‘it’s not right for Muslims to 
be getting so angry.’ But being among Muslims made me realise that this really mattered to some Muslims, 
and they were unable to do what their sympathisers were asking them to do—which was basically to just 
forget about the novel entirely. I could see that these Muslims were headed for a confrontation, and this 
wasn’t good for Muslims or for British society. And because I could identify with them I could understand: 
not because I’m particularly empathetic, as I say, but because I belong to a certain social world. 
You said above that the issues raised by the Rushdie controversy are not confined to one country. Could 
you expand on that? 
Comparable issues to do with Muslims protesting how their religion, especially the Prophet Muhammad, 
is portrayed arose with the Danish Cartoons Affair and more recently the cartoons in Charlie Hebdo. In 
each case, an important question has been to look beyond the horrific violence and murder and to ask 
how, in a multicultural society, groups of people such as Muslims or Jews or blacks should and should 
not be portrayed. We need incitement to hatred legislation, but I think in the main, these issues should 
be dealt with through ‘censure not censor’ (Modood 2006).13We should handle the offensive portrayal 
13 The symposium in which this piece appears in is a good example of an intercultural debate between liberal free-speech 
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of racial and religious minorities through censuring rather than legal bans. When several prominent 
European newspapers and magazines republished the original Danish cartoons of Muhammad, no British 
newspaper or magazine did so, on the grounds that they were not in the business of giving gratuitous 
offence. This is the same British approach that unlike France and many European countries has not tried 
to make Holocaust denial a criminal offence but dealt with it through a culture of civility and censure.
Do you think that racism, and in particular Islamophobia, are growing problems in this country, and what 
can politics do to fight against this rise?
Most of the evidence suggests that racial discrimination, say in relation to jobs, persists. Ethnic 
minorities continue to make progress in terms of socio-economic mobility and participation in public life, 
but that’s mainly because of the extra qualifications they achieve rather than because there is a level playing 
field. On the other hand, I think that racial prejudice is in relative decline if we look at the views of younger 
people compared to older people, and at friendship, dating, relationships, marriage and so on. Yet both in 
terms of employment and social life, suspicion of and hostility to Muslims continues to rise. Partly this is 
collective blame for jihadi terrorism but it’s also an antipathy to publicly asserted religious identities. This 
“Muslim penalty” has to be much more publicly stated as a problem. Blanket condemnation of racism is not 
enough. We need positive national narratives which feature Muslims and Islam as aspects of what it is to be 
British. Politicians also need to work with Muslim communities to identify, isolate and defeat the processes 
leading to terrorism, rather than speak as if Muslims were the problem or that terrorism is a problem the 
Muslim community could solve on its own—or indeed that it could be solved without the full engagement of 
the Muslim communities, including conservative Muslims and critics of government foreign policies.
You said that you see yourself as a multiculturalist intellectual. Do you think multiculturalism is still the 
model we should be following in Britain? 
Multiculturalism is the accommodation of minorities not just as individuals but as people sharing, 
promoting and remaking their group identities within a common citizenship and the rethinking of a 
national story. No doubt this has sometimes been expressed too simply, both theoretically and politically, so 
we must learn from critics emphasising community cohesion, or the fluidity and multiplicity of identities, 
or what is called “interculturalism”. But these are really modifications of multiculturalism, not alternatives 
to it. This is clear as soon as you pose the question: what is it that anti-multiculturalist countries like 
France or Germany have achieved that Britain has failed to achieve? In fact, by virtually any measure you 
care to pick—discrimination and victimisation, social mobility, presence in and participation in public 
life, rethinking national identity in a more inclusive way, inter-ethnic friendships, interfaith dialogue and 
cooperation and so on—the position of non-European origin minorities in Britain is better than in most 
or all other European countries. So, to paraphrase Churchill, British multiculturalism may be the worst 
model, except for all the others. In the last few years I have been particularly sympathetic to voices on the 
centre-left (like Jon Cruddas) emphasising that the cultural identities and anxieties of the majority need to 
be part of a communitarian One Nation politics. I think that is right, but it is important that such a politics 
should not be cast as anti-multiculturalist but should include what might be called a critically evolving 
multiculturalism.14 
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